

Lesson Objective: Comprehend US national security interests in the developing worlds of Latin America and Africa and understand how problems of development affect those interests.

Desired Learning Outcomes:

DLO #1: Describe the major challenges to regional security in Latin America.

These nations are struggling to survive the threats of terrorism, international organized crime, and drug trafficking. We must remain actively engaged in this region to deter aggression, foster peaceful conflict resolution, and encourage democratic development while promoting stability and prosperity. (186)

The greatest threats that confront the region are transnational in nature. They include international organized crime, drugs, terrorism, illegal migration, and arms trafficking. Scanning the AOR, the nations with the most virulent problems are Colombia, Haiti, and Paraguay. (191)

Major challenges to regional security in Latin America:

1. international organized crime (191)
2. drugs (191)
3. terrorism (192)
4. illegal migration (192)
5. arms trafficking (192)
 - illegal arms transfers (192)
 - legal arms transfers: modernization (193) – an issue, but not a challenge.

The article also includes Radio Frequency Spectrum Usage, but this is not a Latin American issue.

1. international organized crime (191)

International criminal organizations threaten stability, corrupt government officials, and hinder some governments' abilities to protect their citizens. Crimes include drugs and arms trafficking, theft, smuggling of illegal migrants, kidnappings, and money laundering.

2. drugs (191)

Supply continues to match demand and we see a number of challenges before us: The three most significant are:

- (1) obtaining sufficient detection, monitoring, and tracking assets to cover all transit routes
 - During 1997, we were provided sufficient DOD and interagency resources to cover approximately 1/5th of the transit and source zones.
- (2) developing the common operating picture required to coordinate and orchestrate hemispheric counterdrug operations
 - The development of a common operating picture or system that will enable us to display simultaneously and in real time data developed by multiple collectors and operating agencies will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of both U.S. and multilateral counterdrug operations.
 - Absent this capability, seams are created which are exploited by traffickers, and handoffs of tracks of interest and prosecution of end game operations are significantly impeded.

(3) sustaining counter drug operations at current levels

- in the face of continued reductions in forces and budgets, we will be hard-pressed to sustain operations during 1998 at the same levels as 1997.

3. terrorism (192)

- Regional insurgent groups pose credible threats to the governments and citizens of this region.
- Major terrorist groups have turned to Latin America as a safe-haven for support bases to sustain worldwide operations.
- Transnational terrorist groups are capable of significant attacks in Latin America. Though U.S. personnel and forces have not been the subject of attack, we are sensitive to their vulnerability.
- Refined and coordinated country-specific force protection programs, coupled with enhanced threat acquisition, analysis, and capabilities, will reduce the vulnerability of our personnel and facilities while advancing mission accomplishment. (194)

4. illegal migration (192)

The SOUTHCOM AOR has become a major avenue for both intra- and inter-hemispheric illegal migration. This migration places a strain through economic and social imbalances on the governments of the region. If unchecked, these imbalances can threaten a nation's sovereignty and internal stability.

Through proactive regional cooperative engagement, we seek to identify and eliminate the causes for population displacement before they occur.

5. arms trafficking (192)

- **illegal arms transfers (192)**

Illegal arms transfers pose a serious threat. Arms caches from civil wars, black markets, military weapons captured by insurgents, and illegal seepage from military armories severely complicate the regional governments' abilities to maintain law and order. E.g., well-armed guerrillas, paramilitary organizations, and narcotraffickers challenge governmental control in Colombia.

- **legal arms transfers: modernization (193)** – issue, not a challenge

Latin American militaries have legitimate modernization requirements.

Purchasing weapons systems from the U.S. brings with it full multi-year support and the desirable element of transparency. Most importantly, the U.S. is able to influence the employment of these weapon systems through training, doctrinal development, and levels of technology release, while enhancing hemispheric cooperative engagement.

The command must be vigilant to maintain interoperability with legacy systems employed by regional security forces. Therefore, SOUTHCOM must assist in modernizing and improving the interoperability of regional security forces. (194)

DLO #2: Evaluate the major political changes that have occurred in most Latin American countries in the 1990s and explain the reasons for these changes.

Practicing Democracy (197):

Practicing Democracy: Driven by selection of opposition parties to military regimes/dictatorships (most significant), selection of opposition parties over corrupt regimes and economic conditions (voting for capitalism). (p. 197)

- During the 80's parties associated with outgoing military regimes were punished at the voting booth
- Elections punished parties that were elected on reform platforms but sinned through corruption once in power
- Poor economic conditions have led to electoral defeat
- Military movements that once used violence to gain power turned to gaining power through politics

New Voices of Dissent (198):

New Voices of Dissent: Reorientation of economies to capitalism caused politicians to decrease state involvement in national economies. This change has driven economic resurgence. An outcome of this change has been the birth of new political parties oriented against the status quo. (p. 198)

- Changes in LA economies required politicians to slow intervention and implement market-oriented policies
- New parties emerged in response to what some perceived as party arrogance and self-perpetuating leadership
- Many voters supporting new parties out of fear or rejection of new pro-market economies

Living Up To Your Constitution (199):

Living Up to Your Constitution: Market oriented economies have weakened the impact of trade unions greatly. Increased government oversight of processes to make government more effective and efficient. (p. 199)

- In LA, parties based on race/ethnicity/language were virtually nonexistent until the 1994 Chiapas uprising in Mexico after curtailment of subsidies. Elite's are now concerned over national integration/social cohesion
- Roles of parliaments and the quality of executive-legislative relation still widely fail to foster the democracy
- One party rule in some countries cripples the legislature
- Party fragmentation has facilitated Presidentialism (or rule by decree)

The Supreme Crisis of Representation (200):

The Supreme Crisis of Representation: 3 types of military assault on constitutional government:

- (1) Overthrow of gov't by high command of military/The less professional the military, the more likely the high command to overthrow the gov't. (Haiti/1991)
 - (2) Military mutinies against the gov't (Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela)
 - (3) A coup led by the elected president wherein he calls on the military to establish a temporary civilian dictatorship - Peru. (p. 200-201)
- Since the mid-80's there have been 3 types of military assault on constitutional government: The 1991 military overthrow of Haiti's government; failed military mutinies against governments or high command; and coups led by presidents using the military to control congress/courts/parties
 - In the 80's and 90's LA barriers to military coups included:
 - Constraint due to the poor performance of military rulers in the 70's and 80's;
 - strength of parties on the democratic right (business elite's whose parties are effective under civilian rule);
 - supply of coup-makers is limited because military officers recall their frustration, unpreparedness, and loss of professionalism when they attempt to run the government

Taking Democracy to Market (201):

Taking Democracy to the Market: Market reforms - including ending subsidies and deregulation - can serve the goals of democratic politics. Has advanced farther in 10 years than any estimated. (p. 201-202)

- Many LA politicians have taken steps to wed market reforms to the consolidation of democracy
- Market reforms (deregulation, privatization, termination subsidies) are serving the goals of democratic politics
- Market reforms are severing the ties between political/economic elite's, narrowing opportunities for corruption
- International market ties provide foreign business/governments leverage to defend constitutional governments
- Foreign institutions are using market power to prevent authoritarian rule and widen political opportunities
- Democracies are more effective at involving the opposition in support of market economies
- Impeachments are being used to remove Presidents from power instead of military coups

Question #2. Why has practicing democracy become so difficult for the Latin American states? Since 1976 no LA president elected in free and fair elections has been overthrown by the military; however persistent fear known as "fracasomania" or obsession with failure haunts the region. Many believe the LA economic success of the first half of the 90's will be short-lived, and there is a sense that levels of official corruption are intolerably high. Other difficulties include rejection of pro-market economies by people concerned over the loss of business subsidies or radical shifts in ideological landscapes, labor party resistance to impacts of market reform, and because, although labeled democracies, party systems of many LA countries are characterized by fragmentation, personalism, patronage, and sometimes a lack of party loyalty.

DLO #3: Explain why the problems of illegal drugs and immigrant workers are sources of tension between post NAFTA Mexico and the US.

In a nutshell, illegal drugs and immigrant workers are sources of tension because they were not dealt with in the NAFTA agreement. The US attempts to pursue supply-side solutions to both problems, thus transferring most of its activity outside its borders, and the blame for the problem. Thus, we attempt to tell Mexico how the problem needs to be solved without acknowledging our complicity in or doing anything about either problem.

- (1) We focus on curbing the foreign supply of drugs and migrant labor vice confronting the domestic drug demand and the American dependency on cheap labor - Attacking the wrong enemy. (p. 204)
- (2) US/Mexico relations are "narcotized" - Our foreign aid is directly based upon compliance to drug control. (p. 204)
- (3) Increased Mexican drug involvement (cocaine transshipment leader) has paralleled NAFTA - friction point in terms of feelings and broadening of border constraints. (p. 205)
- (4) Mexico cut farm subsidies - this increased the incentive for the peasant farmer to grow drugs or become a migrant laborer.
- (5) Solution to migrant problem will be measured in terms of decades - even generations (p. 207)
- (6) US drug policy works on supply via direct means and punishment of users - Only spends 30% of budget on prevention, education and treatment (where payback is far greater).

Solutions:

(1) Raise and enforce labor standards in the US

(2) Focus on drug prevention, education and treatment (p. 206-207)

- Borderless economies undermine efforts to keep borders closed to movement of drugs and migrant labor (203)
- Drug export industry is a leading market force and integral part of the private sector in many countries (205)
- Opening economies through market liberalization reduces the ability of governments to withstand external market pressures, and there is an enormous US market demand for illegal drugs and migrant labor (205)
- Although negligible before NAFTA, 70% of the cocaine, 30% of the heroin, and up to 80% of the marijuana coming into the US is coming through or from Mexico; Mexico accumulated revenues of ~\$30B in 1994 (205)
- Cocaine traffickers established Mexican factories/trucking companies to take advantage NAFTA commerce (206)
- To avoid hampering commerce, only a small percentage of trucks entering from Mexico are inspected (206)
- NAFTA trade liberalization and economic integration helps traffickers, and privatization of state-owned enterprises and deregulation of Mexican banking facilitates laundering of drug profits (206)
- NAFTA agriculture liberalization and cutting of Mexican crop subsidies increased illegal crop production (206); also, at least 600,000 displaced farmers are expected to migrate illegally to US over next 5-10 years (207); however, given 30% of Mexico's 93 million people are farmers, mass exodus to the US may occur (207)
- Increased economic linkages like the border industrialization program have increased immigration; border towns are drawing unemployed labor to the north of Mexico and serve as a springboard into the US (207)
- Before NAFTA, 1-3 million Mexicans entered the US illegally each year. Officials knew NAFTA would accelerate illegal immigration well into the next century so they deliberately excluded it from negotiations (207)
- Huge increases in \$\$ and manpower to clamp down on the border give politicians something to talk about and agencies something to do, but illegal immigration has only increased!!! (207-209)
- US agriculture and the garment industry depend on illegal workers (211)

Question #3. How can borderless economies cope with enforced immigration restrictions?

You can have borderless economies without 'illegal' immigration. However, until the Mexican economy improves, the temptation to *illegally* immigrate to the US will exist. Although this immigration is great for the Mexican economy, it is killing the US economy. This puts the onus on the US to resolve the problem.-----
---Actually enforcing immigration restrictions would be a great start! Real and 'significant' punishment of US employers hiring illegal immigrants would cut out about 90% of the problem (and at a profit based on the payment of significant fines). Elimination of special exceptions to US agriculture and sweatshops so they can make huge profits would solve most of the rest of the problem (especially since the cost to US citizens far outweighs the pennies they save on produce and shirts). Pressuring the Mexican government to increase minimum wages would help. Eliminating border towns and industry would help as well.

DLO #4: Explain US policies toward Cuba despite its greatly diminished strategic importance in the post Cold War era.

Given Cuba's diminishing power, how can we make sense of the overall pattern of US-Cuban relations since the end of the Cold War? Why is it that the US government has established workable relations with every remaining communist government but Cuba? (213)

Four scholarly explanations for the US position (213-214)

1. The distribution of power in the international system, as it changed with the end of the cold War in Europe, is a major explanation for both the dramatic redesign and curtailment of Cuban foreign policy and the repositioning of US policy toward Cuba. It fails to explain the intense US preoccupation with prescribing the details of Cuba's future domestic politics.
2. A second explanation comes from exploring ideological themes of long standing in both US and Cuban policies. There is a close correspondence between current and historical ideological themes in US policy toward Cuba, and these have been exacerbated both by the shift in the international distribution of power and by the decay of the revolutionary belief system in Cuba. US policy toward its near-neighbors has long sought to prescribe the nature of domestic politics and economics. This still fails to explain sufficiently how these large structural and ideological causes have yielded specific militant and ideological US policies in the 1990s.
3. A third explanation considers the role of domestic politics in both countries, arguing that the hardliners have, perhaps unwittingly, helped each other in sustaining or fostering confrontational policies. In particular, members of Congress and certain Cuban American organizations have succeeded in reshaping US policy toward Cuba in the 1990s by making effective strategic use of "mobilizing incidents"; namely, public events that have served as opportunities to encourage the hardline Congressional minority to push through new legislation. [note – recall ethnization of US foreign policy]
4. Given the three preceding arguments, why has the US not invaded Cuba? The US has been deterred from such actions both by Cuba's military capabilities and by the "balancing" provided by other international actors. Western European and Latin American governments and Canada have deterred the US from adopting even more aggressive policies. Accidental war has also been prevented because both the US and Cuba have developed low-key confidence building measures.

This combination of explanations accounts for both high confrontation and impasse in US-Cuban relations in the late 1990s.

Q4: Should the US exert its power and do to Cuba what it did for Haiti and Panama?

DLO #5: Summarize current US strategies to control the flow of illegal drugs from Latin America into the US and gauge the effectiveness of these strategies.

Although US international narcotics control efforts have borne little fruit to date, Congress and the Clinton administration have dramatically increased security assistance to Latin America in the last two years in the name of fighting the war on drugs. (239)

The US war on drugs undermines the efforts to promote human rights, democracy, and regional security. (239)

My summary: The US insists on attacking the problem as a supply-side problem rather than a demand-side problem. Its objective is therefore stated in terms of stopping the flow of drugs across the US border with the result that there are numerous centers of gravity that need to be attacked, and a resulting lack of clarity of the military objective. Military power is fairly obviously not suited for reasons discussed below. The alternatives, particularly those of taking a demand-side approach, have not been thoroughly reviewed. The home front makes such a review impossible. Today's strategy overlooks the fact that the drug "war" is not really a war and comparisons fail quite quickly.

Strategies

1. aiding security forces and training them
2. attacking the flow of drugs in transit
3. targeting the source countries
4. attacking the air bridge

Strategies — expanded look

1. aiding security forces and training them
 - The primary tool for US forces waging the drug war abroad is "security assistance," which can include economic assistance, training, intelligence support, equipment transfer and maintenance support, and advice. (240)
 - These various forms of security assistance are accompanied by training and other forms of support provided directly by the US military. (240)
2. attacking the flow of drugs in transit
 - The flow of US military personnel and equipment to the Andean region has drawn considerable attention, but is a mere trickle compared to the resources the military has spent on its congressionally mandated role as the lead US agency for the detection and monitoring of air and maritime shipments of illegal drugs into the US.
 - Military equipment discovered to be intrinsically ineffective in combating the drug-smuggling threat
 - Drug traffickers quickly adopted new tactics and routes. As air and sea interdiction grew, the bulk of the cocaine traffic began coming overland through Mexico. Yet the military continued to expand air and maritime surveillance.
 - The military's drug surveillance illustrates that performance and effectiveness are not synonymous. "Victory" is declared in small tactical victories even though they contribute little, if any, to the ultimate objective of the drug war—reducing domestic drug use.
3. targeting the source countries (242)
 - shifted emphasis in 1993 from interdicting cocaine as it moved through the transit zones to stopping it at its source in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.
 - Source country operations should focus more on crop eradication and substitution programs than on the disruption of processing and transportation. However, coca substitution programs are expensive and Washington is unable (unwilling?) to pay the tab.
 - The flow of cocaine into this country has increased. Congress blames this on the president's decision to reduce transit zone interdiction efforts. Clinton administration officials argue that Congress cut back funding for interdiction faster than the White House had originally proposed, while failing to provide full funding requested for source country programs.

- Efforts have been met with strong resistance from national leaders concerned about a further erosion of their national sovereignty. US basically forced (blackmailed) regional leaders to sign “hot pursuit” agreements.
- 4. attacking the air bridge
 - While the DOD continues to spend more money on transit zone interdiction programs and assistance to domestic law enforcement agencies, most of the military’s energy, at least in terms of public promotion, is now being spent on source country programs, and in particular its attack on the so-called air bridge that connects coca growers and coca paste manufacturers in Peru and Bolivia with Colombian cocaine refiners and distributors. The aim is to interdict drugs before they enter the transit zone.
 - Problems with shoot-down policy briefly interrupted US sharing of real-time aircraft tracking information. Official immunity from prosecution in case a civilian aircraft was shot down was provided and attack on the air bridge began in 1995 with supply of sophisticated radar and surveillance equipment to the Peruvian and Colombian armed forces.
 - SOUTHCOM officials trumpet Green Clover’s success in terms of disrupting the air bridge, but reports on the extent of this success vary. (243) Laser Strike expands this to include operations aimed at disrupting the river and coastal smuggling routes as well. (244)
 - “results of this multinational, cooperative effort have yielded stunning tactical results. ...” However, the flow of drugs into the country continues to rise and South American coca and poppy production expand. It is acknowledged that these operations had no impact on the availability and price of cocaine in the US. (244)

Effectiveness

1. Even as the DOD plans to further expand its counternarcotics efforts, many within its ranks remain highly critical of the military’s involvement in the drug war.
2. Counternarcotics operations have been hurt by its poor understanding of hitting the enemy’s centers of gravity. By its own estimation, the military is fighting a foe whose defeat is improbable. SOUTHCOM has identified 14 “centers of gravity.”
3. Current supply-side approach is hampered by the “balloon effect” of applying pressure one place only to see the problem pop up somewhere else.
4. Beyond the failure of the drug war to date to stem the flow of illicit drugs into this country, US military personnel express concern about the unintended consequences of a drug war that has led Washington to forge closer ties with military forces that are notorious human rights violators.

Q5: If the means used to win the drug wars means losing the democracy war, who or what is the winner?
The US military, intelligence and drug enforcement agencies are winners in the supply-side assault on the illegal drug trade. They have been able to redefine their missions to function in an area that is seeing increased funding. They stay in business. The politicians are winners. They vote for “get-tough” legislation and funding and look like they are “doing something” about drugs. The American people are winners in that any changes, confrontations, and so on don’t occur on American soil, and they don’t have to confront the reality of the problem as it actually exists within our borders. They have the luxury of continuing the fiction that isn’t really a US problem, it’s “their” problem. An assault on the demand-side of the illegal drug trade, as rational, economic, and honest as it might be, is not what the public wants to see and hear.

STRATEGY ANALYSIS

- (1) What Is It About?
- (2) Is the National Military Strategy Tailored to Meet the National Political Objectives?
- (3) What are the Limits of Military Power?
- (4) What are the Alternatives?
- (5) How Strong is the Home Front?
- (6) Does Today's Strategy Overlook Points of Difference and Exaggerate Points of Likeness Between Past and Present?

DLO #6: Describe the major national interests of the US in sub-Saharan Africa.

Two criteria help identify a regional interest: (251-252)

1. US has committed or is likely to commit significant public-sector resources to advance or protect the interest.
2. The interest is a major foreign policy end in itself, not simply a contributor to a larger objective.

In addition, such interests should be relatively long-term and enduring, and they should transcend the ideological perspectives of individual administrations. (252)

* 11 major national interests of the US in sub-Saharan Africa (note that all entries are interrelated and at least somewhat codependent): (252)

1. Regional stability
2. US access to key persons, institutions, facilities, and economic opportunity
3. Information and warning
4. Safety of American citizens
5. Region free of WMD
6. Region free of sponsors or safe havens for transnational threats
7. Regional comity and cooperation
8. Freedom from egregious suffering
9. Regional governance that is humane, managerially competent, and accountable
10. Sustained economic development
11. Unthreatened natural environment

1. Regional stability (252)

- “the absence of significant interstate or intrastate violence”
- enduring stability requires the reduction or elimination of the problems that create the conditions for violence.
- Threatened by ready availability of conventional arms
- Protection of all other interests depends on this one.

2. US access to key persons, institutions, facilities, and economic opportunity (253)

- Military access: occasional military use of African ports, airfields, and other infrastructure for contingency operations; unimpeded use of sea lines of communication (SLOC)
 - Access to African political decisionmakers
- Economic access: the ability of US commercial enterprises to enter African markets, participate in African economic development, and compete for fair profit
 - Access to local and regional economic decisionmakers

- Openness of African media to messages from the US to influence African political and economic choices
 - Ability of American private-sector groups to establish relations with individual Africans and indigenous institutions
3. Information and warning (254)
 - Obtaining timely, reliable, information about African issues, trends, events, and personalities.
 - Such information is difficult to obtain in sub-Saharan Africa
 - Absence can lead to humanitarian tragedies; lethally slow responses to transnational threats; puts US lawmakers at risk of manipulation by foreign groups
 4. Safety of American citizens (254)
 - US will expend enormous effort to protect or evacuate American citizens from conditions of escalating disorder
 - Security threats usually caused by instability, poverty, and related violence, not deliberate efforts of parties in the region to victimize Americans
 5. Region free of WMD (254-255)
 - Nonproliferation of such weapons is a vital national interest
 - Sub-Saharan Africa has not been a significant venue for development or deployment of WMD
 - Africa could also be the venue for the development of natural WMD. Any disease is but a plane ride away from the population centers of the world.
 6. Region free of sponsors or safe havens for transnational threats (255)
 - Interest in ensuring that no African country sponsor or harbor perpetrators of any of a range of transnational threats.
 - Transnational threats are created by the activities of international crime syndicates, including those that move illegal drugs and launder the proceeds, operations by international terrorist groups, activities of international “con artists,” perpetrators of banking scams, and depredations against civil discourse by technologically sophisticated vandals (netwar).
 7. Regional comity and cooperation (256)
 - Comity of nations = the courtesy and friendship of nations marked especially by mutual recognition of executive, legislative, and judicial acts. (Merriam Webster)
 - Interest that African nations engage in peaceful diplomatic and economic activity
 - Participate as willing and capable partners with the US in a wide variety of activities in Africa and elsewhere
 - Contributes directly to economic development and regional stability
 8. Freedom from egregious suffering (256)
 - Profound human suffering affronts basic American values and almost inevitably provokes a public response (albeit sometimes short-lived)
 - [my note: If this can be avoided, the US government doesn’t have to be so reactive in its foreign policy, and has the space to be proactive should it so choose.]
 - Focused on encouraging respect for human rights and ending human rights abuses

- While freedom from egregious suffering is strongly anchored in American values, protection of this interest is a prerequisite to others, including regional stability and safety of American citizens.
9. Regional governance that is humane, managerially competent, and accountable (257)
- Some strongly believe the US should promote a more-or-less Western model of participatory democracy throughout the world
 - It is in our interest that African governments share respect for human rights, the rule of law, informed management of infrastructure and resources, and accountability to the society being served.
10. Sustained economic development (258)
- Many of Africa's problems derive from poverty and inequitable access to the limited goods and benefits of African states.
 - Significant economic progress could moderate many of the region's most profound problems
 - The clear implication is that economic development in Africa would bear tangibly and directly on US economic well-being as well as its own. (my note – lest we think we are being altruistic here)
11. Unthreatened natural environment (259)
- Economic development could conflict with unthreatened natural environment
 - Uncontrolled development that results in widespread environmental degradation is neither in Africa's long-term best interest nor that of the rest of the world
 - Environmental challenges against rain forests, fragile savanna lands, water sources, atmosphere, soil, and rivers (effluents), declining habitats
 - Many threats to Africa's natural environment don't originate in Africa – overfishing by commercial fleets from Europe and Asia; toxic waste disposal from developed countries; poaching of African rhinoceros.
 - Important as a global heritage; biodiversity for world scientific research; stability of flora may be important to regional or worldwide weather patterns – it is very much in the interest of the developed world to foster responsible stewardship of the African natural environment

Q6: Cite the 11 interests of the US in Sub-Saharan Africa.

See DLO #6

DLO #7: Describe the general cultural, economic, and technologic diversity that characterizes modern Africa.

George Nzongola-Ntalaja

Cultural Diversity: Africa is thought to be a black continent - In fact, over 100,000,000 Arabs live there (largest concentration in the world). Muslim versus Catholic religions in Africa. Lack of tolerance for cultural diversity drives ethnic cleansing and politically inspired ethnic conflicts in Africa. (p. 264-265)

Economic Diversity: Africa is a source of raw materials and underdeveloped labor. Internally, a land of Haves and Have Nots. The solution lies in economic integration internal to Africa. (p. 265-266)

Technological Diversity: Africa does not need "high tech" - it needs appropriate technology. It does not possess the correct technology to permit it to harness its strengths. (p. 266-267)

Cultural Diversity (264-265):

- Over 100 million Arabs and a significant minority of whites of European origin live in Africa
- Outside predominantly Muslim North Africa, traditional African religions coexist with Islam and Christianity
- Judaism, Christianity, and Islam penetrated Africa between 500BC and 1000AD
- Africans have usually succeeded in blending these religions with their own cultural beliefs, values, and practices
- Africans feel they don't have to abandon 'all' their traditional values to achieve African (vs Western) 'modernization'
- Much of everyday life is marked by ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity
- Relatively peaceful coexistence is being threatened by rulers who seek to divide people along ethnic lines for purposes of maintaining power, and by the specter of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic militants

Economic Diversity (265-266):

- Economic diversity, as gross inequality in the distribution of resources, is a violation of the basic rights of people to a satisfactory environment for economic and social development
- The primary role of African countries has been to serve as sources of raw materials for developed economies
- Thirty years after independence, African countries remain mineral and agriculturally export oriented
- State control of production/marketing resulted in privatization of resources by a minority of wealthy citizens
- Economic diversity is 'social class specific', i.e., Africa contains some of the world's richest²poorest people
- Elite's fear democracy because their predatory economic role requires the ability to contain popular discontent
- Developmental policy experiments of the last four decades failed to raise the standard of living for the majority; instead, they succeeded only in giving the ruling elite access to foreign exchange
- The best solution to the problem of economic development can only be found within Africa itself

Technological Diversity (266-267):

- Africa's wealthy enjoy the latest technology while the poor use tools and implements developed centuries ago
- Biggest paradox in African economy is the coexistence of abject poverty with an abundant wealth in resources
- Africans lack the technology and the tools crucial for transforming their natural resources
- The African environment (deserts, rain forests, few natural harbors, low-lying rivers, debilitating diseases, mountains, poor soils, and humidity) diminish the performance of technologies--the development of *appropriate technology* (i.e., affordable, maintainable, environmentally sound technology) is needed

Question #7. Of cultural, economic & technologic diversity, why is understanding cultural diversity essential to Africa stability?

Because, in a world of cultural diversity, tolerance for different identities/views/values/beliefs, as long as they are not contrary to fundamental human rights, is the *sine qua non* of peace and harmony in a pluralistic society.

DLO #8: Assess the major successes and failures of the post-apartheid South Africa.

Successes

1. Good succession scheme to Mandela – Political succession has been skillfully managed and will likely occur without the debilitating power struggles that often arise when great leaders bow out. (269)
2. Inflation has been steadily declining, the rand has retained its value, and foreign direct investment has begun to trickle in (269)
3. Market-friendly macroeconomic strategy – foreign donors report that they do not even raise economic policy conditions when negotiating grants to the government. (269)
4. Government has steadily shifted spending priorities away from defense and toward poverty relief. Govt. has provided electricity and water supply. (however, still faces popular impatience – see problems) (269)
5. ANC reaffirmed its well-established non-racial credentials by electing seven non-Africans to the party's ten top executive positions. (270) [my note: did the author mean "*black* Africans"?]
6. Small white parties unlikely to play the race card too strongly – their only chance in gaining access to government lies in attracting black voters. (271)
7. No political party is questioning the legitimacy of elections, seeing them instead as the main game in town. There may be a heightening of racial rhetoric and a rash of redistribution promises as elections approach. But such polarization can be read as a product of, rather than a threat to, the gradual consolidation of democracy. (271)
8. Political violence is on the decline. (271)
9. Concerns of the threat of political monopoly overlook countervailing powers, unusually strong by African standards, embedded in South Africa's state (especially the constitutional court and numerous public watchdog agencies) and its civil society (which features a plural press and nongovernmental organizations). These elements can quickly call into questions the legitimacy of a corrupt government. (273)

Failures and problems

1. Economic growth rate and unemployment – steady expansion of economy has not been able to make a dent in unemployment (269)
2. Gold prices plummeting – led to the closure of unprofitable mines (269)
3. Official efforts at black empowerment are criticized as elitist – In the face of extreme social inequalities, any democratically elected government will face powerful demands for redistribution. And policies of economic reapportionment will inevitably engender conflict between would-be winners and prospective losers. (269)
4. Government still faces popular impatience – remains dogged by complaints that fewer than 1/3 of houses promised have actually been constructed. (270)
5. Doubts have surfaced about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission –
 - TRC granted a blanket amnesty to top ANC leaders without public hearings.
 - Truth does not automatically lead to reconciliation; righting of wrongs will require more than criminal justice for official perpetrators; it must also include a meaningful measure of social justice that involves broad sacrifices from apartheid's multiple beneficiaries.
 - The most important goal of the TRC is to change how white South Africans think. It has so far failed. Few whites are willing to admit complicity in apartheid. (271)
6. Criminal violence is on the rise. The larger threat to social stability comes from criminal violence. Crime has become increasingly organized and internationalized, with Russians, Colombians, and Nigerians believed to be involved in smuggling drugs and guns into South Africa and diamonds and luxury cars out. Is the state defaulting on its most basic duty to provide law and order? (272)

7. Restoration of public confidence in the police and the courts will take time, not helped by the ANC's slow start in grappling with issues of law and order. (272)
8. Revolution of rising expectations: the state can't deliver improved material welfare at the rate its citizens demand. (272)
9. Fiscal crisis of local government originates in the rent and service boycotts. These mass actions bred a culture of nonpayment that has proved difficult to eradicate. (273)
10. Unclear whether municipalities that once served only an affluent minority can command enough resources to address all needs even if everyone pays. (273)

Summary:

Constitutional order will likely remain democratic.

Economic strategy will become increasingly mixed.

Political discourse will be sharply polarized.

State incapacity would appear to be at least as serious a constraint to overcoming poverty as persistently low rates of economic growth.

Q8: In post-apartheid South Africa, the law of rising expectations is afoot. What does that mean?

Citizens also expect the state to improve material welfare. Popular demands are especially intense in South Africa, whose transition was in large part a revolution of rising expectations. South Africans view democracy instrumentally, associating it with jobs, incomes, and housing rather than with its intrinsic guarantees of civil and political freedoms. (272)

This means that the government is under strong pressure to deliver basic goods and services, preferably before the next election. (272)

DLO #9: Explain the reasons for and the sustainability of sub-Saharan Africa's present economic growth.

Reasons for sub-Saharan Africa's present economic growth:

- 1 temporary result of
 - favorable weather
 - higher prices for African commodities
 - recovery of production after civil war
 - small boom following the end of apartheid in South Africa
- 2 more sustainable result of better policies, reflected in
 - more stable macroeconomies
 - higher and more efficient production
 - return of private capital, foreign and domestic

Sustainability of sub-Saharan Africa's present economic growth: (277)

Africa still has a long way to go. A sustainable recovery will require steady increases in savings and investment, diversification from commodities like copper and coffee with unstable prices, and major improvements in infrastructure, education, and health care, all of which have deteriorated over the past two decades. Most African countries still owe large amounts of foreign debt, which limits their ability to meet their domestic needs.

The Developing World: Latin America and Africa

Furthermore, governments with low administrative and technical capacity will need to manage their entry into volatile global markets, something even sophisticated East Asian governments have found difficult. (277)

Obstacles to sustainable growth: (277)

- 1 steady increases in savings and investment
 - current trends in savings and investment do not bode well for a sustainable recovery.
 - Putting unused capacity back to work will boost growth for a short while, but African countries need investment-to-GDP ratios of around 25% to sustain growth
 - Foreign aid will be unable to bridge the gap
 - Private sector will be hard pressed to make it up because the infrastructure is not in place
- 2 diversification from commodities like copper and coffee with unstable prices
 - institutions to support modern businesses are not well entrenched in Africa
 - stock markets are extremely thin and often only symbolic
 - foreign investment is heavily concentrated in a few countries
 - dependence on foreign funds puts a premium on the ability to maintain economic and political stability
- 3 major improvements in infrastructure, education, and health care
 - manufacturing (east Asian route) or diversified, high-value agricultural products (Chilean route) would be more likely to lead to sustainable broad-based growth in Africa than investments in oil and other traditional export commodities
 - due to low productivity and vexing infrastructure weaknesses, Africa is still less competitive than many Asian countries with higher wages
 - freight charges and insurance for exports from Africa's landlocked countries are 7 times those for exports from developing countries in general
- 4 owe large amounts of foreign debt, which limits their ability to meet their domestic needs
 - Africa's debt overhang is yet another obstacle to sustainable growth
 - Debt is primarily owed to official creditors.
 - Debt write-off requires three to six years of limits on governmental spending and other stiff reforms to qualify
- 5 governments with low administrative and technical capacity will need to manage their entry into volatile global markets, something even sophisticated East Asian governments have found difficult

Q9: Will economic growth in Africa continue after an Asian collapse?

The east Asian crisis presents three potential areas of fallout: (278)

1. a direct "contagion effect"
 2. lower demand for African exports and less Asian investment in Africa
 3. question of relevance of the Asian model for African development strategies
-
1. a direct "contagion effect"
 - There is little evidence that African currency and capital markets will catch the "Asian flu." The small markets are not really globalized and mainly attract small domestic investment. Few countries have full currency convertibility, which means there is less opportunity for currency speculation. South Africa is an exception, but the market recovered and the government was able to maintain credibility as a macroeconomic manager. (278)

2. lower demand for African exports and less Asian investment in Africa
 - African equity funds have been affected by the ripples from Asia, especially those funds with heavy investments in mining and raw materials whose Asian demand has dropped.
 - Commodity producers face increased competition, with Asian devalued currencies
 - Garment and textile exporters are concerned about competitive pressures stemming from the newly lower wages in Asia
3. question of relevance of the Asian model for African development strategies
 - African leaders have voiced admiration for the Asian model of development
 - When Asian countries were at the stage Africa finds itself now, they intervened extensively in their economies. Liberalization came later. The fact that the less liberalized countries (China, Taiwan) have also been affected by the currency crisis has not passed unnoticed in Africa.
 - African countries now have a better case for arguing for a slower pace of reform when pressed to liberalize their financial sectors and capital accounts

DLO #10: Explain how a new group of leaders in sub-Saharan Africa are attempting to influence the region.

Now, with the clear exception of Nigeria, Africa's post-colonial despotic order is finally breaking down. (279)

Several new trends are evident: (279-281)

1. Pre-colonial ethnic conflicts—exploited by local political forces—have reemerged with a vengeance. Ethnic and clan-based political identities are resurfacing.
2. Propensity of African states to invade each other.
3. A new generation of leaders backed by highly trained and disciplined armies are assuming power.
 - Most assertive are former guerilla commanders who developed their character and worldview as their movements defeated foreign-supported, postcolonial despots in drawn-out struggles.
 - Highly nationalistic, though students of Marxism
 - Organizing along democratic-centralist lines and planning to nationalize their economies
 - Pragmatists, favoring free markets
 - Insist that corruption, not class difference, is the greatest threat to national development
 - Steeped in values of national secularism, sought to incorporate disenfranchised ethnic and religious groups
 - *Not one of these leaders can easily be called democratic, as each still runs a de facto one-party state*

Some of these states are coalescing into a new political and military bloc that, though relatively small, aspires to remake much of the continent. At its core are **Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia**, and **Eritrea**, with **Angola** and **South Africa** playing smaller roles. These countries enjoy the sympathies of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Burundi. While these new leaders disagree over tactics, they share the goal of ending cronyism and instability that has epitomized postcolonial Africa. (281)

The new four-state African bloc emerged from the prior understandings between the men who are now leaders of Eritrea (Isaias Afewerki) and Ethiopia (Meles Zenawi) on the one hand, and Uganda (Yoweri Kaguta Museveni) and Rwanda (Paul Kagame) on the other. These leaders still disagree on many issues, however. (284)

Influences within the region:

Anti-cronyism - Isaias of Eritrea lambasted the assembled heads of state [of the OAS] for neglecting Africa's problems while wasting money on their own lavish lifestyles.

"new axis across the continent" – some international observers see a new axis emerging across the continent, linking leaders who seek to break the corrupt and colonial ties of the past and ending the vast patronage systems that have undermined African development. (286) Africa's new leaders aspire to reverse this decline [of living standards, per capita income, etc.] (287)

development through investment – The bloc's four countries encourage development through investment and work rather than through foreign aid. (288)

limited influence – Although the bloc is cohesive, its influence elsewhere on the continent is modest. So far, the bloc's influence has been limited to central and eastern Africa as well as the Horn. (290)

aims to inspire regimes in its image – Supports rebels in Sudan: each state now provides bases, logistical support, and arms to Sudanese rebel groups operating from its territory, with their combined momentum even drawing US support. (285) Supports change elsewhere in Africa, even in states beyond its reach like Nigeria. (291) Has bolstered the opposition in other countries like Kenya. (291)

human rights abuses – Congo's recent massacres (288); lack of freedom of the press; lack of political freedom;

Although disorder reigns over much of the continent, Africa's new leaders have begun to fill the vacuum left by the end of the Cold War. (291)

Balance between the moral and pragmatic approaches: The Clinton administration has embraced the bloc and its allies. US army special forces have been training Rwandan troops. Albright sidestepped many abuses, including the massacres in the Congo, drawing criticism from human rights organizations. (291-292)

Moral versus pragmatic views are at the heart of most foreign policy debates; the most sustainable solutions usually result from a synthesis of both. Such a policy is appropriate for dealing with Africa's new bloc, which is led by market-oriented men who earned their mandates through protracted struggle. Although they still resist foreign guidance on democracy and human rights, they are far more responsive, accountable, and egalitarian than any of their predecessors. Together they comprise a new political-military alliance that is engaged in joint campaigns from the Great Lakes to the Sahara. *However imperfect, the bloc changes Africa's balance of power.*

Q10: What is the Bloc of Four? How can we presume this 'Bloc' can bring order to chaos?

Questions for Study and Discussion:

Q1: Within both these continents we are dealing with literally dozens of countries with dozens of problems. How could these problems be best grouped? In what way do these problems impinge upon US interests?

Q2: Why has practicing democracy become so difficult for the Latin American states? Why is it so easy for African states?

